How-to guide

How to give vendors safe access to your cloud

Learn how to give contractors and vendors time-limited, least-privilege access to your cloud, with logging, approvals and a clean way to revoke it.

By the Cloudverg engineering team · · 7 min read

Why this matters

A vendor who needs to fix something in your cloud usually asks for admin. That request is convenient for them and dangerous for you. If their laptop is compromised or their engineer leaves, your account is exposed. You also inherit their mistakes: a deleted bucket, a changed firewall rule, a key committed to a public repo.

Good vendor access is not about trust. It is about scope and time. You decide which resources they can touch, how long the access lasts, and what record proves what they did. Done well, this protects you and makes the vendor's job easier because they know exactly what they have.

This guide covers the operational mechanics: how to receive a request, map it to a role, grant it, watch it, and close it. It applies whether the work is a one-week migration or an ongoing support contract with a managed service provider.

Before you start

Get the request in writing. Ask the vendor for the exact actions they need, the resources involved, the expected duration and the named people who will use the access. A vague ask like full admin on the production account is a red flag. Push back until they name the services and the operations.

Inventory what you have. List the cloud accounts, projects and subscriptions in scope, plus the identity provider you use. If you have single sign-on with a provider like Okta, Entra ID or Google Workspace, use it. Federated access means the vendor logs in through their own identity provider, and you can cut them off by disabling one account instead of hunting for local users.

Decide who approves. One named person on your side should own vendor access for each account, with a backup. That owner reviews requests, approves grants and runs the offboarding. Without an owner, temporary access quietly becomes permanent.

Set the ground rules in the contract or a short access agreement. Cover: no shared credentials, no local users for individuals, all work through the approved path, and immediate notice if the vendor's staff changes or their systems are breached. Keep it short enough that people actually read it.

How to do it

The pattern is the same across AWS, Azure and Google Cloud: a dedicated identity, a narrow role, a time limit and a log. Start with a separate identity for the vendor organization, not a personal email. For AWS, create an IAM role with a trust policy that only allows the vendor's account or their SSO provider to assume it. For Azure, use guest accounts in Entra ID with access packages and conditional access. For Google Cloud, use a Google Group as the principal and grant roles to the group, not to individuals.

Attach the smallest policy that covers the task. If the vendor is debugging a Kubernetes cluster, they may need read access to logs and pod status, not permission to delete workloads. If they are applying Terraform, they need write access to specific resource types in one project. Test the policy against their stated actions before you hand it over. Most cloud consoles have a policy simulator or an access analyzer you can run.

Put a clock on it. Use time-bound access wherever your platform allows: AWS IAM Identity Center permission sets with session duration limits, Azure Privileged Identity Management activations, or Google Cloud IAM conditions with an expiry. Where native expiry is missing, create a ticket with a hard end date and a reminder to remove access.

Make them prove who they are. Require multi-factor authentication on the vendor side and, if possible, enforce it on yours with a conditional access policy that blocks sign-in without MFA. For AWS, add a condition to the role trust policy that requires MFA. For any console work, require the vendor to connect from their managed devices, and block access from unusual countries if that fits the work.

Turn on the paper trail. CloudTrail, Azure Activity Log and Google Cloud Audit Logs should already be on. Send them to a central log store the vendor cannot write to. Add alerts for sensitive actions: creating access keys, changing IAM policies, disabling logging, opening a security group to the world. You want to know within minutes, not at the next quarterly review.

  1. Collect the request in writing. Ask the vendor to list the exact actions, resources, duration and named users. Reject vague requests for admin and ask them to narrow it down.
  2. Pick a vendor-level identity. Create a role, group or guest account that belongs to the vendor organization, not an individual. Tie it to their identity provider where possible.
  3. Attach the smallest role. Grant only the permissions the stated task needs, scoped to the specific project, account or resource. Run a policy simulator before you hand it over.
  4. Require MFA and a managed device. Enforce multi-factor authentication on the vendor side and block sign-in without it. Restrict access to known IP ranges or a VPN if the work allows.
  5. Set an expiry date. Use time-bound access with a hard end date, or create a ticket with a reminder. Do not leave the grant open-ended.
  6. Route logs to a store the vendor cannot change. Send audit logs to a central account and alert on sensitive actions like key creation, policy changes and logging being disabled.
  7. Review the first session. Read the logs after day one. Check for denied attempts, unexpected actions and any sign the scope is wrong.
  8. Revoke and verify at the end. Remove the role or group membership, end active sessions and delete any keys the vendor created. Confirm the vendor can no longer sign in.

How to check it worked

After the first session, pull the logs and read them. Did the vendor use only the role you granted? Were there denied attempts, which tell you the policy may be too tight or the request was wrong? Did anyone try to escalate? A short review after the first day catches most problems while the work is still fresh.

Run an access review weekly while the engagement is active. List every principal with access to the account, mark which are vendors, and confirm each still needs what it has. Use the cloud's built-in tools: IAM Access Analyzer for AWS, Entra ID access reviews for Azure, and Policy Analyzer for Google Cloud. These show unused permissions and external access.

Test the offboarding before you need it. Pick one vendor role and revoke it in a staging account, then confirm the vendor cannot sign in and that any active sessions end. For AWS, revoke active sessions with the console or by updating the role's session policy. For Azure, revoke sign-in sessions and refresh tokens. For Google Cloud, remove the group membership and check that inherited roles disappear.

Keep a simple register: vendor name, contact, accounts, role, start date, end date, approver. Update it when anything changes. This register is what you hand to an auditor or a customer security reviewer, and it takes ten minutes to maintain.

Mistakes to avoid

The most common mistake is giving a personal account to a named engineer. When that person leaves the vendor, nobody tells you. Always use a vendor-level identity, group or role, and make the vendor responsible for managing their own people inside it.

Second is sharing long-lived access keys. Keys get pasted into chat, committed to repos and reused on laptops. Prefer federation and short sessions. If a key is unavoidable, scope it tightly, set it to expire, and rotate it after the engagement.

Third is forgetting the network layer. Even a read-only role can leak data if the vendor can reach it from anywhere. Restrict access to known IP ranges or require a VPN or bastion host. For database work, use a session manager rather than opening a public port.

Fourth is leaving the door open after the invoice is paid. Build the removal into your process: when the engagement ends, revoke the role, remove group membership, delete any keys the vendor created, and confirm in the logs. If you want an outside check on how your vendor access looks across accounts, a fixed-scope review such as the Cloudverg Cloud security review at $6,500/month is one option among others, alongside an internal audit or a specialist consultant.

Frequently asked questions

Should vendors get their own accounts in our cloud?

Not individual local accounts. Use a vendor-level role, group or guest identity tied to their organization, so access survives staff changes on their side and you can revoke it in one place. If you must create named accounts, tie them to your identity provider and set an expiry.

How long should vendor access last?

As short as the work allows. Set the expiry to the expected end date of the task plus a small buffer, then extend only if the vendor asks and you approve. Ongoing support contracts should still be reviewed on a fixed schedule.

What should we log for vendor access?

Every authentication and every API call the vendor makes, at minimum. Route those logs to an account the vendor cannot write to, and alert on sensitive actions such as creating access keys, changing IAM policies or disabling logging.

Can we give read-only access and still let the vendor fix things?

Sometimes. Many fixes need write access, but you can split the work: vendor diagnoses with read-only access, then requests a short, scoped write grant for the specific change. That keeps the window small and the blast radius limited.

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